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ABSTRACT
The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge the conjunctive probability P(A ∧B) to be greater than a constituent probability P(A),
contrary to the norms of probability theory. This fallacy is a reliable, consistent and systematic part of people’s probability judgements,
attested in many studies over at least 40 years. For some events, these fallacies occur very frequently in people’s judgements (at rates of
80% or more), while for other events, the fallacies are very rare (occurring at rates of 10% or less). This wide range of fallacy rates presents
a challenge for current theories of the conjunction fallacy. We show how this wide range of observed fallacy rates can be explained by a simple
model where people reason according to probability theory but are subject to random noise in the reasoning process. Copyright © 2016 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
The capacity to reason with uncertain knowledge (that is, to
reason with probabilities) is central to human intelligence.
But how do people estimate and reason about probabilities?
One revealing aspect of human probabilistic reasoning is
the reliable occurrence of the conjunction fallacy in people’s
probability judgements. Probability theory requires that the
probability of a conjunction of two events, P(A ∧ B) (the
chances of both A and B occurring together), can never be
greater than the probability of a constituent event A (or B).
This requirement follows from the fact that A ∧ B can only
occur if A itself occurs. The conjunction fallacy occurs be-
cause people reliably violate this requirement for some events,
giving probability estimates for conjunctions that are greater
than the estimates they gave for a constituent of that conjunc-
tion (contrary to the requirements of probability theory).
Two well-known examples of the conjunction fallacy
comes from Tversky & Kahneman (1983) and concern Linda
and Bill:
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.
She majored in philosophy. As a student she was deeply
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice,
and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations”
“Bill is 34 years old. He is intelligent, but unimaginative,
compulsive and generally lifeless. In school, he was strong
in mathematics but weak in social studies and humanities.”
Participants in Tversky and Kahneman’s study read these de-
scriptions and were asked to rank various statements ‘by their
probability’. For the Linda description, two of these state-
ments were
Linda is a bank teller: Að Þ
Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist
movement: A∧Bð Þ
while for the Bill description, two statements were
Bill plays jazz f or a hobby: Að Þ
Bill is an accountant who plays jazz f or a hobby: A∧Bð Þ
Tversky and Kahneman found that for both of these de-
scriptions, more than 85% of participants ranked A ∧ B as
more probable than A, committing the conjunction fallacy
in a very reliable way. The reliability and robustness of the
conjunction fallacy have been confirmed in many subsequent
studies (Costello, 2009a; Fantino, Kulik, Stolarz-Fantino, &
Wright, 1997; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996; Gavanski & Roskos-
Ewoldsen, 1991; Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002;
Stolarz-Fantino, Fantino, Zizzo, & Wen, 2003; Tentori,
Bonini, & Osherson, 2004; Wedell & Moro, 2008).
While the conjunction fallacy is an undeniable part of
human probabilistic reasoning, it does not occur at the same
rate for all conjunctions. The conjunction fallacy occurs very
frequently for the Linda example (which, after all, is
explicitly designed to demonstrate the fallacy) but occurs sig-
nificantly less frequently for other materials. Numerous ex-
perimental studies have shown that the occurrence of this
fallacy depends on the probabilities of A and B. In particular,
the lower the probability of the less probable constituent P(A),
and the higher both P(B) and the conditional probability
P(A|B), the more frequent the conjunction fallacy is (Carlson
& Yates, 1989; Costello, 2009b; Fantino et al., 1997; Fisk &
Pidgeon, 1996; Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991). For
example, Fisk & Pidgeon (1996) found that while the con-
junction fallacy occurs at rates up to 85% in cases where P(A)
was low and P(B) was high, the fallacy occurred at rates as
low as 10% in cases where P(A) and P(B) were both low
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(conjunction fallacy rates from Fisk and Pidgeon (1996) are
shown in Tables 2 and 3).
Tversky and Kahneman’s demonstration of the
conjunction fallacy has had a major impact on our view of
the processes behind people’s probabilistic reasoning. In par-
ticular, the conjunction fallacy contributed to a shift away
from the idea that people are ‘intuitive statisticians’ who ap-
proximately follow the tenets of probability theory in their
judgements (Peterson & Beach, 1967) to the view that peo-
ple’s probability judgements follow ‘a limited number of
heuristics which sometimes yield reasonable judgements
and sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors’ (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1973, p. 237). An important aim in research
on the psychology of probabilistic judgement, therefore, is
to produce a theory explaining the occurrence of the conjunc-
tion fallacy. Current theories, however, struggle to explain
the wide variation in rates of occurrence of the fallacy for dif-
ferent conjunctions. Our aim in this paper is to show how this
wide variation in fallacy rates can be explained in the frame-
work of our ‘probability theory plus noise’ model. This
model rejects the idea that people estimate probabilities using
heuristics and instead assumes that people reason according
to probability theory but are subject to random noise in the
reasoning process; in the model, this random noise causes
the systematic biases seen in people’s probability estimates
(see Costello & Watts, 2014 for details).
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the first
section, we provide some background by briefly reviewing
current theories of the conjunction fallacy. In the second sec-
tion, we present our model and show how it can explain the
wide variation in conjunction fallacy rates seen in experi-
mental studies. In the three subsequent sections, we test the
predictions of this model by applying it to three sets of exper-
imental data from Zhao, Shah, and Osherson (2009), Fisk
and Pidgeon (1996) and Costello and Watts (2014). In the fi-
nal section, we give a general discussion of our results.
THEORIES OF THE CONJUNCTION FALLACY
Tversky and Kahneman explained the conjunction fallacy in
terms of a representativeness heuristic, in which probability
is assessed in terms of the degree to which an instance is rep-
resentative of a (single or conjunctive) category. In this view,
people gave a higher rating to the conjunctive statement in
the Linda example because the instance Linda was more rep-
resentative of (that is, more similar to members of) the con-
junctive category ‘bank-teller and active feminist’ than the
single category ‘bank-teller’.
Although the representativeness heuristic remains the
standard explanation of the conjunction fallacy in textbooks,
a range of experimental results give convincing evidence
against this account. Notice that the representativeness
heuristic only applies when a question asks about the proba-
bility of membership of an instance in a conjunctive category
and when knowledge about representative members of that
category is available. Evidence against representativeness
comes from results showing that the conjunction fallacy
occurs frequently when these requirements do not hold. For
example, studies by Osherson, Bonini and colleagues have
shown that the conjunction fallacy occurs frequently when
people are asked to bet on the occurrence of unique future
events: such bets are not questions about membership of an
instance in a category, and so representativeness cannot
explain the occurrence of the fallacy in these cases (Bonini,
Tentori, & Osherson, 2004; Sides et al., 2002; Tentori
et al., 2004).
Further problematic results for the representativeness ac-
count come from studies by Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen
(1991). One study compared fallacy rates for conjunctions
for which compelling representativeness information was
available (questions such as Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda
example) against fallacy rates for conjunctions where there
was no representativeness information available (questions
about the number of eyes of, and hair colour of, aliens on
imaginary planets about which no information was avail-
able). Materials were constructed so that the probabilities of
constituent events were matched across ‘representative’ and
‘non-representative’ conjunctions. Gavanski and Roskos-
Ewoldsen (1991) found that the conjunction fallacy was just
as frequent for conjunctions for which no representativeness
information was available as it was for Linda type conjunc-
tions. Indeed, pairing representative and non-representative
conjunctions with the same constituent probabilities, they
found no significant difference in fallacy rates between these
two types of conjunction.
Another study by Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1991)
provides a different line of evidence against the representa-
tiveness account. Notice that the representativeness account
implicitly assumes that estimating a conjunctive probability
P(A ∧ B) is equivalent to judging the likelihood that an item
(the individual Linda) is a member of a conjunctive category
A ∧ B (the category of ‘people who are bank tellers and ac-
tive feminists’). While some conjunctive probabilities in-
volve such judgements about an item’s membership in a
conjunctive category, other conjunctive probabilities do
not. Because the representativeness explanation for the con-
junction fallacy depends on membership in a conjunctive cat-
egory, this account predicts that the fallacy will not occur for
these other conjunctions.
To test this, Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1991) com-
pared fallacy rates in ‘standard’ and ‘mixed’ problems using
descriptions from Tversky and Kahneman (1983). For stan-
dard problems, each conjunction was composed of two
events from the same description (conjunctions such as
‘Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement’
or ‘Bill is an accountant who plays jazz for a hobby’). These
standard problems thus represented questions about Linda or
Bill’s membership in conjunctive categories. Mixed prob-
lems contained the same target descriptions and component
questions as standard problems. However, each conjunction
was composed of one event from the first description and
one from the second (conjunctions such as ‘Linda is active
in the feminist movement and Bill plays jazz for a hobby’).
These mixed problems thus do not represent questions about
Linda or Bill’s membership in conjunctive categories. The
representativeness account predicts that the conjunction fal-
lacy will occur for the standard problems but not for the
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mixed problems. Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1991)
found, however, that the fallacy occurred just as frequently
in these two different types of problem, and the occurrence
of the fallacy depended only on the probability of the two
constituent events in a conjunction. This undermines the idea
that the conjunction fallacy occurs because an item is a rep-
resentative member of a conjunctive category.
This observation also causes problems for other, more re-
cent, accounts in which the conjunction fallacy depends in
some way on membership in conjunctive categories or clas-
ses. One such is the ‘fuzzy-trace’ or ‘denominator neglect’
account by Reyna et al. (Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd,
2008; Wolfe & Reyna, 2010). The core of this account is that
the conjunction fallacy is a class-inclusion error where peo-
ple judge an item (Linda) to be a member of a subset class
(‘bank tellers that are feminists’) but not a member of the in-
cluding class (‘bank tellers’). In this account, overlapping
class-inclusion relationships create processing interference
or confusion and lead people to commit class-inclusion er-
rors such as the conjunction fallacy. The mixed problems
used in Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1991), however,
do not involve class inclusion. Instead, they ask about the
probability of Linda being a member of a single class ‘ac-
tive feminists’ versus the conjunctive probability of Linda
being a member of that class and a different individual
(Bill) being a member of a different single class (‘people
who play jazz as a hobby’). The fact that the conjunction
fallacy occurs just as frequently for these mixed problems
as for standard conjunction fallacy problems is hard to ex-
plain in this account.
If the conjunction fallacy is not caused by differences in
representativeness or class-inclusion relationships, what does
cause this fallacy? A number of accounts have suggested
that the fallacy arises because people compute conjunctive
probabilities P(A ∧ B) from constituent probabilities P(A)
and P(B) using some form of average of the two constituent
probabilities (Carlson & Yates, 1989; Fantino et al., 1997).
Most recently, Nilsson, Juslin and colleagues (Juslin, Nilsson,
&Winman, 2009; Nilsson,Winman, Juslin, & Hansson, 2009)
have proposed a more sophisticated ‘configural weighted
average’ model where conjunctive probabilities are computed
by a weighted average of constituent probability values, with
a greater weight given to the lower constituent probability.
Taking P(A) to be the lower of the two constituent probabili-
ties, in this account we have
P A∧Bð Þ ¼ βP Að Þ þ 1  βð ÞP Bð Þ
where β is a weighting parameter that falls between 0.5 and 1.
All these averaging accounts impose the requirement that
P(A ∧ B) > P(A), where P(A) is the lower constituent
probability, for all events A and B (except when P(A) = P(B)).
These accounts thus predict that the conjunction fallacy
should occur 100% of the time for all pairs of events (except
when P(A) = P(B)). This is clearly not the case, however.
To address this problem, the Nilsson et al. model also in-
cludes a noise component that randomly perturbs individ-
ual conjunctive probability estimates, sometimes moving
the conjunctive probability below the lower constituent
probability and so eliminating the conjunction fallacy for
that estimate. Because P(A ∧ B) > P(A), and because
this noise component is random (and so moves the conjunc-
tive probability P(A ∧ B) downward 50% of the time and
upward the remaining 50%), this configural weighted
averaging model predicts that the conjunction fallacy rate
should occur at least 50% of the time for all conjunctions.
The low conjunction fallacy rates we see for some conjunc-
tions (less than 10%, as in Fisk and Pidgeon (1996)) are thus
clearly a challenge for this model.
Finally, in our original ‘probability theory plus noise’
model, the conjunction fallacy occurs purely as a result of
random noise in a reasoning process that follows the
requirements of probability theory (Costello, 2009b;
Costello, 2009a; Costello & Watts, 2014). This model,
however, imposes the requirement that P(A ∧ B) ≤ P(A)
on average, where P(A) is the lower constituent probabil-
ity. Because on average P(A ∧ B) ≤ P(A), and since this
noise component is random (and so moves the conjunc-
tive probability P(A∧B) downward 50% of the time and
upward the remaining 50%), this model predicts that the
conjunction fallacy rate should always be 50% or less for all
conjunctions. The high conjunction fallacy rates we see for
some conjunctions (80% or more in Tversky and
Kahneman’s studies and in Fisk and Pidgeon (1996)) are
thus clearly a challenge for this probability theory plus
noise model. Our aim in this paper is to resolve this
challenge by showing how a slight extension of this model
gives a natural explanation for these high fallacy rates.
THE ‘PROBABILITY THEORY PLUS NOISE’ MODEL
Our model assumes that people’s probability judgements are
produced by a mechanism that is fundamentally rational but
is perturbed in various ways purely random noise or error. In
taking this approach, we are following a line leading back at
least to Thurstone (1927) and taken up in various ways by
other more recent researchers (e.g. Dougherty, Gettys, &
Ogden, 1999; Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994; Hilbert,
2012). Our contribution in this paper is to show that the
‘probability theory plus noise’ account can explain the
occurrence of the conjunction fallacy in people’s probability
judgements and can explain the wide variation in rates at
which that fallacy occurs.
In standard probability theory, the probability of some
event A is estimated by drawing a random sample of
events, counting the number of those events that are in-
stances of A and dividing by the sample size. In probabil-
ity theory, the expected value of these estimates is equal to
P(A), the probability of A; individual estimates vary with
an approximately normal distribution around this value.
We assume that people estimate the probability of A in ex-
actly this way: randomly sampling episodes from memory,
counting the number that are A and dividing by the sample
size. We assume a long-term memory from which a ran-
dom sample of episodes or traces can be drawn. For some
event A, we assume that each episode i in our sample
holds a flag that is set to 1 if i contains event A and set
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to 0 otherwise. An estimate for the probability of A, in this
model, is obtained by randomly sampling episodes from
memory, counting the number where the flag for A is set
to 1 and dividing by the sample size.
If this counting process was error-free, people’s estimates
would have an expected value of P(A). Human memory is
subject to various forms of random error, however. To reflect
this, we assume a minimal form of transient random noise in
which there is some small probability d < 0.5 that when
some flag is read, the value obtained is not the correct value
for that flag. We assume that this noise is symmetric, so that
the probability of 1 being read as 0 is the same as the proba-
bility of 0 being read as 1. We also assume a minimal repre-
sentation where every type of event, be it a simple event A, a
conjunctive event A∧B, a disjunctive event A∨B or any
other more complex form, is represented by such a flag,
and where every flag has the same probability d of being read
incorrectly.
A randomly sampled event will be counted as A if the
event truly is A and its flag is read correctly (this occurs with
a probability (1 d)P(A), because P(A) events are truly A
and flags have a 1 d chance of being read correctly), or if
the event is truly ¬A (not A) and its flag is read incorrectly
as A (this occurs with a probability (1P(A))d, because
1P(A) events are truly ¬A, and flags have a d chance of
being read incorrectly). The expected value for a noisy esti-
mate for the probability of A is thus
PE Að Þh i ¼ 1  dð ÞP Að Þ þ 1  P Að Þð Þd
¼ 1  2dð ÞP Að Þ þ d (1)
with individual estimates varying independently with an ap-
proximately normal distribution around this value. This aver-
age is systematically biased away from the ‘true’ probability
P(A), such that estimates will tend to be greater than P(A)
when P(A) < 0.5 and will tend to be less than P(A) when
P(A) > 0.5. This model explains a number of observed pat-
terns of bias in people’s probability estimates, such as con-
servatism or underconfidence, subadditivity and binary
complementarity (Costello & Watts, 2014). Note that be-
cause this model assumes that a probability estimate for A
is obtained by counting the proportion of A’s in a random
sample of events, probability estimates produced by the
model necessarily fall in the range 0… 1 (as long as the error
rate d is a true rate: that is, as long as d also falls in the range
0… 1).
Because we assume that the chance of a random error d is
the same for conjunctions and disjunctions of events as it is
for individual events, we also obtain
PE A∧Bð Þh i ¼ 1  2dð ÞP A∧Bð Þ þ d (2)
and
PE A∨Bð Þh i ¼ 1  2dð ÞP A∨Bð Þ þ d
From this, the model also makes the surprising prediction
that while people’s probability estimates will be biased away
from the ‘true’ value in various ways, for some specific ex-
pressions, this bias will ‘cancel out’; for these expressions,
people’s probability estimates will agree with the require-
ments of probability theory. One such cancelling expression
is probability theory’s ‘addition law’:
PE Að Þ þ PE Bð Þ  PE A∧Bð Þ  PE A∨Bð Þ ¼ 0
Probability theory requires that this expression has a value
of 0 for all events A,B. Substituting the model’s predicted ex-
pected values into this expression, we see that the model pre-
dicts an average value of 0 for this expression, just as required
by standard probability theory. A series of experiments show
that this prediction does in fact hold: values for this ex-
pression, computed from people’s individual probability esti-
mates, are on average strikingly close to zero, just as required
(Costello & Watts, 2014). (Note that this value of 0 for the
addition law is also predicted by other accounts of the con-
junction fallacy, such as the configural weighted averaging
account of Nilsson and colleagues; see Nilsson, Juslin, and
Winman (2016) for this prediction, and Costello and Watts
(2016) for our response. We also address the distinction
between these two models in our analysis of experimental
values for the addition law expression subsequently).
The conjunction fallacy occurs in this model because in-
dividual estimates for both P(A) and P(A ∧ B) vary ran-
domly around their expected values. This random
variation means that some individual estimates will occur
where PE(A) < PE(A ∧ B), producing a conjunction fal-
lacy response. The closer the expected values hPE(A)i and
hPE(A ∧ B)i are to each other, the greater the chance of
this fallacy response occurring. These values are closest
when P(A) is low and both P(B) and P(A|B) are high, and
so the model predicts that the conjunction fallacy will
be most frequent when these criteria hold. This is just the
pattern seen in studies of the conjunction fallacy (Carlson
& Yates, 1989; Costello, 2009b; Fantino et al., 1997;
Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991).
This model is also consistent with more specific results
showing that the degree to which B causes A has an impact
on conjunction fallacy rates (Pidgeon, 1998; Tentori, Crupi,
& Russo, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). We illustrate
this using Tversky and Kahneman’s original experiment in-
vestigating the role of causality on conjunction fallacy occurrence.
If an event B causes A, then by definition P(A|B) > P(A)
(the probability of A, given the causing event B is higher
than the probability of A simpliciter). Tversky & Kahneman
(1983) gave one group of participants a problem where this
causal link held; that is, where P(A|B) > P(A):
A health survey was conducted in a representative sample
of adult males in British Columbia of all ages and occupa-
tions. Mr. F. was included in the sample. He was selected
by chance from the list of participants.
Which of the following statements is more probable?
(check one)
• Mr. F. has had one or more heart attacks. (A)
• Mr.F. has had one or more heart attacks and he is
over 55 years old. (A∧B1)
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A substantial proportion (58%) of participants produced
the conjunction fallacy for this problem. Tversky and Kahne-
man then gave another group of participants an alternative
problem:
A health survey was conducted in a representative sample
of adult males in British Columbia of all ages and occupa-
tions. Mr. F. and Mr. G. were both included in the sample.
They were unrelated and were selected by chance from the
list of participants.
Which of the following statements is more probable?
(check one)
• Mr: F: has had one or more heart attacks: Að Þ
•Mr: F has had one or more heart attacks and
Mr: G: is over 55 years old: A∧B2ð Þ
This alternative has the same constituent probabilities as in
the original problem (the event A is the same across both prob-
lems, and B1 and B2 refer to the same event: a randomly sam-
pled person being over 55years). In this alternative problem,
however, we have P(A|B2) = P(A) because the chance of Mr.
F. having had a heart attack (event A) is not affected by the ad-
ditional information that Mr. G. is over 55years old (event B2).
A significantly lower proportion (29%) of participants in
Tversky and Kahneman’s study produced the conjunction fal-
lacy for this alternative problem, showing that the causal link
between constituents influences conjunction fallacy rates.
This pattern of results is just as expected in our model.
From Equation (2), we have
PE A∧B1ð Þh i ¼ 1  2dð ÞP A∧B1ð Þ þ d
¼ 1  2dð ÞP A B1ÞP B1ð Þ þ djð
and
PE A∧B2ð Þh i ¼ 1  2dð ÞP A∧B2ð Þ þ d
¼ 1  2dð ÞPðAjB2ÞP B2ð Þ þ d
¼ 1  2dð ÞP Að ÞP B2ð Þ þ d
Because these problems are designed so that P(A|B1)
> P(A) and P(B2) = P(B1), we see that hPE(A ∧ B1)i
>hPE(A ∧ B2)i necessarily holds. This in turn implies that
hPE(A ∧ B1)i is closer to hPE(A)i, and so the model predicts
higher conjunction fallacy rates for A ∧ B1, just as observed.
In this model, the difference between the expected value
for P(A) and the expected value for P(A ∧ B) is
PE AÞð i PE A∧Bð Þh i ¼ 1  2dð Þ P Að Þ  P A∧Bð Þ½ h
Because by definition, P(A)  P(A ∧ B) ≥ 0, and by
assumption, d < 0.5, this model predicts that
PE A∧Bð Þh i≤ PE Að Þh i
must always hold: that is, with the same rate of error d for
single events and conjunctions, this model requires the av-
erage value for the conjunctive probability PE(A ∧ B) will
never be greater than the average value for its constituent
A. Since individual estimates PE(A ∧ B) and PE(A) are both
perturbed by random noise (which is equally likely to be pos-
itive or negative), the requirement that hPE(A ∧ B)i ≤
PE(A)i means that an individual estimate PE(A ∧ B) can
randomly fall above an estimate PE(A) at most 50% of the
time. While fallacy rates of less than 50% do hold for many
events, there are some pairs of events for which fallacy rates
are significantly higher than this bound (Tversky and
Kahneman’s Linda and Bill being two examples). We now
show how a slight extension of the model can explain these
high fallacy rates, by allowing the average value for the con-
junctive probability to be greater than the average value for
its constituent in certain situations.
Increased noise in combined expressions
In our original presentation of the probability theory plus
noise model, as described earlier, we assumed that the occur-
rence of all events (simple events and any form of conjunc-
tion or disjunction) is recorded via flags representing those
events. We also assumed that the rate of random error d is
the same for all flags, and so there is the same rate of error
when counting instances of a simple event A and when
counting instances of a conjunction A∧B or disjunction A ∨ B.
These assumptions give a useful first-order approximation
representing a noisy memory system, but are clearly unre-
alistic: they assume, for example, that all possible conjunc-
tions or disjunctions that could ever be observed are
explicitly represented by flags in memory. Here, we give a
slightly more realistic version of this model: a second-order
approximation of noisy memory.
As before, the probability of some event A is obtained by
sampling a set of episodes and counting the number that con-
tains A. Rather than assuming that the presence or absence of
A in a given episode i is represented by a flag, we assume that
there is some classification mechanism that takes episode i as
input and processes it to give a decision indicating whether
the episode is an example of A or not. We assume that this
process is subject to symmetric random noise such that for
a given event A, it has a chance d of mistakenly classifying
items that are truly A as not A and the same chance of mistak-
enly classifying items that are truly not A as A. Finally, we
assume that the level of random noise d associated with the
classification of episodes as examples of A depends in some
way on the complexity of A: the more complex A is, the more
difficult the classification process is, and so the greater the
value of d. We do not give any formal description of the
complexity of different types of events (we address this
informally in the Discussion section below), beyond noting
that conjunctions A ∧ B and disjunctions A ∨ B are more
complex than their constituent events A and B.
Our original model assumed that the error rate d was the
same for all types of event. In this extended model, however,
we would expect the rate of random error when counting
conjunctions and disjunctions to be slightly higher than the
rate when counting occurrences of single events. This is
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because classifying a given instance as an example of a con-
junction A ∧ B or a disjunction A ∨ B is more complex
than classifying it as an example of one of the constituent cat-
egories A and B (classification in a conjunction A ∧ B or a
disjunction A ∨ B requires two component decisions, one
for each constituent, while classification in A or B requires
only a single such decision). To reflect this expectation of in-
creased random error in counting conjunctions and disjunc-
tions, we assume a rate of random error of d for single
events but of d + Δd for conjunctions and disjunctions
(where Δd represents some small increase in the rate of ran-
dom error). This assumption follows the standard statistical
concept of propagation of error, which states that if two var-
iables A and B are subject to random error, then a complex
variable (e.g. A ∧ B) that is a function of those two variables
will have a higher rate of error than either variable on its
own.
In this extended model, we have hPE(A)i = (1  2d)
P(A) + d as before, but
PE A∧Bð Þh i ¼ 1  2 d þ Δd½ ð ÞP A∧Bð Þ þ d þ Δd½  (3)
and
PE A∨Bð Þi ¼ 12 dþΔd½ ð ÞP A∨Bð Þþ dþΔd½ h
With this extension, we see that the model no longer re-
quires hPE(A ∧ B)i ≤ hPE(A)i; instead hPE(A ∧ B)i >
PE(A)i can hold when
1  2 dþΔd½ ð ÞP A∧Bð Þþ d þ Δd½  > 1  2dð ÞP Að Þ þ d
or equivalently when
Δd 1  2P A∧Bð Þ½  > 1  2dð Þ P Að Þ  P A∧Bð Þ½  (4)
From this expression, we see that the average estimate for
A ∧ B can be higher than the average estimate for its constit-
uent A when Δd is positive; when 1  2P(A ∧ B) > 0
(that is, when P(A ∧ B) < 0.5); and when P(A)  P(A ∧ B)
is small (that is, when P(A ∧ B) is close to P(A)). When
these three requirements hold, the model predicts the occur-
rence of the conjunction fallacy in averaged estimates; that
is, it predicts hPE(A ∧ B)i > hPE(A)i. Because individual
estimates PE(A ∧ B) and PE(A) are both perturbed by
random noise (which is equally likely to be positive or neg-
ative), when these requirements hold and so hPE(A ∧ B)i >
hPE(A)i, we expect that an individual estimate PE(A ∧ B)
will randomly fall above an estimate PE(A) more than 50%
of the time. In other words, this model predicts that the
conjunction fallacy should occur in individual estimates
more than 50% of the time when these requirements hold.
The greater the difference between the left and right-hand
terms in this inequality, the greater the rate of conjunction
fallacy occurrence.
This modification leads to a slight change in the
model’s predictions about the cancelling expressions de-
scribed earlier. For the addition law, we obtain an expected
value of
1  2dð ÞP Að Þ þ d þ 1  2dð ÞP Bð Þ þ d
 1  2 d þ Δdð Þð ÞP A∧Bð Þ  d þ Δdð Þ
 1  2 d þ Δdð Þð ÞP A∨Bð Þ  d þ Δdð Þ
¼ 2Δd P A∧Bð Þ þ P A∨Bð Þ  1ð Þ
¼ 2Δd P Að Þ þ P Bð Þ  1ð Þ
and because P(A) + P(B)  1 takes only values in the
range 1 to +1, the expected value for this expression is
predicted to always be within 2Δd of 0. In other words,
while the original model predicted that values for the addi-
tion law would be distributed around a mean of 0 for all
pairs of events A,B, this model predicts that for each pair
A,B, these values will be distributed around a mean that
is close to 0 (within 2Δd of 0), with the precise value of
that mean varying with the probabilities P(A) and P(B).
Because in this model, we also have
P A∧Bð Þ þ P A∨Bð Þ  1 ¼ PE A∧Bð Þh i þ PE A∨Bð Þh i  1
1  2 d þ Δdð Þ
and
P Að Þ þ P Bð Þ  1 ¼ PE Að Þh i þ PE Bð Þh i  1
1 2d
(by rearranging Equations (1) and (3)), we expect that values
for the addition law will vary around zero in a way that is
directly proportional to both hPE(A ∧ B)i+ hPE(A ∨ B)i  1
and hPE(A)i+ hPE(B)i1. As far as we can see, Nilsson
and colleagues’ configural weighted averaging model
(Nilsson et al., 2009; Nilsson et al., 2016) does not make
these predictions, allowing us to distinguish between the
two models. We investigate these predictions in the section
on the addition law below.
Just like the original model, this extended model explains
observed patterns of bias in people’s probability estimates
such as conservatism or underconfidence, subadditivity and
binary complementarity (Costello & Watts, 2014). This is
because all those patterns involve single events only and
not conjunctions or disjunctions. In the next sections, we test
this extended model in three ways: by applying to probability
estimation data from Zhao et al. (2009), to conjunction
fallacy rates from a study by Fisk and Pidgeon (1996) and
to data about variation in single and conjunctive probability
estimates and in values of the addition law from a previous
experiment of our own (Experiment 1 in Costello (2009a)).
In each case, the results support the proposed model.
VARIATION AND VALUES OF d AND Δd
How realistic is the idea that noise rates are higher in con-
junctive probability estimates than in constituent probability
estimates? We can test this idea in two ways: by comparing
the standard deviations (SDs) of conjunctive and constituent
probability estimates (if noise rates are higher for conjunc-
tions, we would expect higher SDs) and by considering the
degree to which people’s probability estimates for conjunc-
tive and single events differ from the true objective
Conjunction fallacy 309F. Costello and P. Watts
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Behav. Dec. Making, 30, 304–321 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/bdm
probabilities of those events (if noise rates were higher for
conjunctions, we would expect this difference between esti-
mated and true probabilities to be greater for conjunctions).
We can carry out both these tests using results reported by
Zhao et al. (2009).
Zhao et al. (2009) describe two experiments where partic-
ipants viewed 12 sets of geometric shapes on a computer
screen. Each set was a mixture of 20 triangles, squares and
circles in blue, red and green (all three shapes and all three
colors appeared in every set). For each set, Zhao et al.
(2009) chose one colour and one shape to serve as the cate-
gories A and B. A different choice was made for each of
the 12 sets; for six sets, A was a colour and B a shape, the
reverse held for the other six. After viewing each set, partic-
ipants were asked to estimate the probability that a randomly
selected item from that set would be B or the probability that
a randomly selected item from that set would be A ∧ B. If A
was ‘red’ and B was ‘square’ in a given set, for example, par-
ticipants were asked to estimate the probability that a random
item from that set would be red or the probability that a ran-
dom item from that set would be a red square. (Participants
were also asked to estimate conditional probabilities P(A|B)
and P(B|A); however, we do not consider these estimates in
our analysis). There were 45 participants in each experiment:
Zhao et al. (2009) averaged across all these participants esti-
mates for low, medium and high sets (Table 1).
As Table 1 shows, the SDs for low, medium and high
conjunctive probabilities A ∧ B were higher than the SDs
for the corresponding low, medium and high constituent
probabilities B in both experiments. This is consistent with
the proposal that random variation is higher in conjunctions
than in single events. Table 1 also shows that the difference
between objective probabilities and probability estimates
was higher for conjunctions than for single events (root
mean-squared differences of 0.08 versus 0.03 in both exper-
iments). This is also consistent with our proposal, where the
difference between objective and estimated probabilities
would be higher for conjunctions because of the assumed
higher noise rates. As a further test of this proposal, we con-
sidered whether the absolute difference between objective
and estimated probabilities was related to the SD of those es-
timated probabilities. Recall that in the probability theory
plus noise model, increased noise (and so increased SD in es-
timated probabilities) should be related to increased differ-
ence between estimated and objective probabilities. Across
the 12 probability estimates in Table 1, there was a reliable
positive correlation between degree of difference between es-
timated and objective probabilities, and the SD of estimated
probabilities (r(10) = 0.62, p < 0.05). This is in line with
the model’s predictions.
Finally, as an additional test, we fitted the probability the-
ory plus noise equations for single and conjunctive probabil-
ity estimates (Equations (1) and (3)) to the average estimates
given by participants in the experiments (Table 1). To per-
form this fit, we simply took the objective probabilities used
in the experiment and searched for the values of d and Δd
which, when combined with those objective probabilities
as in the equations, produced probability estimates that
were closest to the average probability estimates given in
the experiment (in terms of root mean-squared differences).
In both experiments, the best fitting values were d = 0.05
and Δd = 0.04, supporting the idea of greater random noise
in conjunctive estimates than constituents.
SIMULATION OF THE MODEL
It is clear from Equation (4) that the conjunction fallacy rate
in this model is related to the values of P(A), P(A ∧ B) and
values of d and Δd. We examined this relationship in detail
via Monte Carlo simulation, by writing a program that simu-
lates the effects of random noise in recall on probability esti-
mations for a given set of probabilities. This ‘single-estimate’
simulation program took as input three probabilities PI(A),
PI(B) and PI(A ∧ B). The program constructed a ‘memory’
containing 250 items, each item containing flags A, B, A ∧ B
indicating whether that item was an example of the given
event. The occurrence of those flags in memory exactly
matched the probabilities of the given event as specified by
the three input probabilities. This program also took as input
Table 1. Objective probability values and average probability estimates (and SD) for B and A ∧B from Tables 2 and 3 in Zhao et al. (2009),




Estimates (Experiment 1) Estimates (Experiment 2)
Participants (SD) Model Participants (SD) Model
P(B) 0.3 0.31 (0.07) 0.32 0.29 (0.05) 0.32
P(B) 0.6 0.58 (0.07) 0.59 0.59 (0.08) 0.59
P(B) 0.9 0.86 (0.04) 0.86 0.85 (0.05) 0.86
RMSD from objective probabilities 0.03 0.03
P(A ∧ B) 0.1 0.19 (0.08) 0.17 0.17 (0.06) 0.17
P(A ∧ B) 0.4 0.5 (0.10) 0.42 0.51 (0.16) 0.42
P(A ∧B) 0.8 0.8 (0.07) 0.75 0.78 (0.06) 0.75
RMSD from objective probabilities 0.08 0.08
SD, standard deviation; RMSD, root mean-squared differences.
SDs were higher for conjunctive estimates than single estimates. RMSD values were higher for conjunctions, indicating that the difference between estimates
and objective probabilities was higher for conjunctions. For both experiments, the best-fitting results were produced by the model equations with d = 0.05
and Δd = 0.04.
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noise parameter values d and Δd, representing the noise rate
and the increase in noise for conjunctions. When reading flag
values from memory to generate some probability estimate
for a single event PE(A), the program was designed to have
a random chance d of returning the incorrect value for a flag;
when reading flags to generate an estimate for a combined
event PE(A ∧ B), the program had a random chance equal
to d + Δd of returning the incorrect value for a flag. To pro-
duce an estimate for the probability of some given event, the
program simply went through the memory reading the values
of flags for that event (subject to this random error in reading)
and returned the proportion of flags that were read as true as
its estimate for the probability of the given event.
For a given set of input probabilities PI(A), PI(B) and
PI(A ∧ B), each run of this single-estimate simulation
program generated a single noisy estimate for each of the
probabilities PE(A), PE(B) and PE(A ∧ B). These represent
a single individual’s estimates for the probabilities of these
events. A conjunction fallacy occurs in these estimates if
PE(A) < PE(A ∧ B) or PE(B) < PE(A ∧ B).
We used this single-estimate simulation program to test
the extent to which the probability theory plus noise model
can match the range of conjunction fallacy rates observed
in experimental studies. To carry out this test, we applied
the simulation to the conjunction fallacy results reported in
an experiment by Fisk and Pidgeon (1996). That experiment
used a within-subjects design with the type of conjunction
being the principal independent variable. Three types of A ∧ B
conjunction were constructed: LL (where A and B were
both likely); LU (where A was likely and B unlikely) and
UU (where both A and B were unlikely). Participants in the
experiment saw questions about 10 different scenarios, in-
cluding the Linda scenario, other scenarios from Tversky
and Kahneman (1983) and various similar scenarios. For
each scenario, participants gave probability judgements for
various constituents A, B and for the likelihood of the three
types of conjunction A ∧ B (the LL conjunctions, LU
conjunctions and UU conjunctions). Fisk and Pidgeon (1996)
report the average probability estimate for each constituent
and each conjunction (in their Table 5). For each scenario
and conjunction type, they also report single conjunction fal-
lacy rates (where participants judge a conjunction to be more
likely than one of its constituents), double conjunction
fallacy rates (where participants judge a conjunction to be
more likely than both of its constituents) and non-fallacy
rates (in their Table 2).
To apply this single-estimate simulation program to
Fisk and Pidgeon’s data, we created a ‘multiple-estimate’
Table 2. Observed and simulated probability estimates and single conjunction fallacy rates
Scenario
Conjunction hPE(A)i hPE(B)i
hPE(A ∧B)i Single fallacy rate
type (Observed) (Observed) (Observed) (Simulation) (Observed) (Simulation)
1 LL 0.84 0.62 0.71 0.61 51.1 39.1
1 LU 0.84 0.21 0.42 0.22 83.9 65.7
1 UU 0.32 0.14 0.14 0.13 31.1 31.3
2 LL 0.66 0.76 0.73 0.65 33.3 36.6
2 LU 0.66 0.19 0.31 0.20 69.2 68.8
3 LL 0.66 0.76 0.74 0.65 35.5 35.6
3 LU 0.76 0.28 0.37 0.28 64.8 60.2
3 UU 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.14 31.8 32.2
4 LL 0.74 0.76 0.71 0.73 31.2 26.5
4 LU 0.74 0.26 0.35 0.27 59.3 62.3
4 UU 0.18 0.26 0.13 0.18 39.6 39.9
5 LL 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.68 35.9 30.4
5 LU 0.69 0.33 0.39 0.33 48.4 50.4
5 UU 0.33 0.11 0.13 0.11 53.8 57.7
6 LL 0.68 0.77 0.69 0.67 42.7 37.5
6 LU 0.68 0.17 0.21 0.17 50.0 47.1
6 UU 0.24 0.17 0.08 0.14 6.6 5.3
7 LL 0.74 0.70 0.61 0.69 27.2 28.0
7 LU 0.74 0.26 0.32 0.26 55.1 52.5
7 UU 0.27 0.26 0.19 0.27 31.1 34.0
8 LL 0.82 0.84 0.79 0.80 18.4 16.3
8 LU 0.82 0.23 0.31 0.23 52.4 52.4
8 UU 0.33 0.18 0.11 0.17 20.9 20.1
9 LL 0.59 0.85 0.63 0.58 42.9 40.3
9 LU 0.85 0.31 0.42 0.32 69.0 56.3
9 UU 0.25 0.13 0.09 0.12 26.4 25.6
10 LL 0.70 0.78 0.71 0.69 47.1 32.7
10 LU 0.78 0.18 0.28 0.19 60.0 58.6
10 UU 0.28 0.18 0.12 0.17 25.6 29.3
Observed data are from Fisk and Pidgeon (1996). Simulated data are with d = 0.05 and Δd = 0.015. Simulated estimates for constituent probabilities are not
reported, as they exactly matched the observed estimates in all cases. The mean absolute difference between simulated and observed fallacy rates was M = 3.9
on the 100-point percentage scale; the mean absolute difference between simulated and observed conjunctive probability estimates was less than 0.06 (compar-
ing across both constituent and conjunctive probability estimates, the mean absolute difference between observed and simulated probability estimates was 0.02).
The correlation between observed and simulated fallacy rates was r = 0.95, p < 0.0001; the correlation between observed and simulated conjunctive proba-
bility estimates was r = 0.96, p < 0.0001. Conjunction fallacy rates in the simulation ranged from as high as 68.8 to as low as 5.3.
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simulation program. This program took as input fixed values
of d and Δd, all hPE(A)i and hPE(B)i values from the Fisk and
Pidgeon (1996) data and the single and double conjunction
fallacy rates for each conjunction. For each conjunction A
and B, the multiple-estimate program used the given esti-
mates hPE(A)i and hPE(B)i and the fixed value input of d to
compute input probabilities PI(A) and PI(B) for the single-
estimate simulation, using the expression
PI Að Þ ¼ PE Að Þh i  d1  2d
This expression is the inverse of our expression for the av-
erage value of a probability estimate hPE(A)i given the ‘true’
probability P(A). By using this expression to compute the
input probabilities for our simulation, we ensure that the
average of the single-estimate simulation’s noisy estimates
for the probability of A and B will be the same as the average
estimate given by Fisk and Pidgeon’s participants. To find an
input probability for the conjunction PI(A ∧ B), the program
iteratively considered all possible values of PI(A∧B) that
were less than the minimum of PI(A) and PI(B) and greater
than both 0 and PI(A) + PI(B)  1 (and so were consistent
with the rules of probability theory). For each of these
values, the multiple-estimate program called the single-
estimate program 1000 times with inputs PI(A), PI(B), d
and Δd. This generated 1000 noisy estimates PE(A), PE(B)
and PE(A ∧ B); the program then computed the rate at which
single conjunction fallacies occurred in those individual esti-
mates. The value of PI(A ∧ B) for which this computed sin-
gle conjunction fallacy rate was closest to the single
conjunction fallacy rate observed by Fisk and Pigeon for that
conjunction was recorded as the best fitting value of PI
(A ∧ B).
Note that this simulation process applied the same values
of d and Δd to all probability estimates from the Fisk and
Pidgeon data: the values d and Δd were the same in each
run of the simulation across all conjunctions and scenarios.
To find values of d and Δd that gave the closest overall agree-
ment with Fisk and Pidgeon’s results, we simply ran the
overall simulation a number of different times with various
different values of d and Δd.
Simulation results
Table 2 shows the results of this simulation of Fisk and
Pidgeon’s data for the best-fitting values of d and Δd
(d = 0.05 and Δd = 0.015; a similar fit was obtained for a
range of other similar values for d and Δd). As this table
shows, the single fallacy rates produced by the simulation
for a given pair of constituent probabilities A,B closely
agreed with the observed single fallacy rates for those con-
junctions. The mean absolute difference between observed
and simulated fallacy rates was low (=3.9 on the 100-point
percentage scale), and the correlation between observed and
simulated fallacy rates was high (r = 0.95, p < 0.0001).
The chance-corrected coefficient of identity between ob-
served and simulated fallacy rates was e=0.99 (where
e = 1.0 indicates perfect identity; see Zegers and Ten Berge
(1985); Zegers (1986) for this measure of identity). The
mean absolute difference between observed and simulated
conjunctive probability estimates was also low (M = 0.06),
and their correlation and coefficient of identity values were
also high (r = 0.96, p < 0.0001, e = 0.98). Simulated
probability estimates for single events A and B were identical
to the observed probability rates in all cases, giving an over-
all mean absolute difference between observed and simulated
probability estimates (across both single and conjunctive
events) of less than 0.02.
There was little difference between the overall average
single fallacy rates in the experiment (M=42.9%) and in
the simulation (M=40.4%). A similar, although less close,
fit was obtained for double conjunction fallacies: the average
absolute difference between simulated and observed double
fallacy rates was less than 7%, and overall double fallacy
rates were higher in the experiment (M = 9.1%) than in
the simulation (M = 1.5%). Combining both single and
double fallacy data, the correlation between observed and
simulated fallacy rates was very high (r = 0.93,
p <0.0001, e = 0.97).
Taken together, these results show that the probability
theory plus noise model can give a close match to the prob-
ability estimates for single events, probability estimates for
conjunctive events and conjunction fallacy rates seen in Fisk
and Pidgeon (1996). Note, however, that these results repre-
sent a best fit, produced when the model is allowed to select
the best-matching value for each of the 29 conjunctive input
probabilities PI (A ∧ B).
One possible concern readers might have with our simula-
tion is that the 29 parameters PI(A∧B) representing conjunc-
tive probabilities would allow us to fit any set of 29 data
points, and so the fact that the model fits the 29 data points
in the Fisk and Pidgeon conjunction fallacy data is not sur-
prising. We think this concern is unfounded because the 29
conjunctive probability parameters are not in fact fully free:
these parameters cannot take any value from 0 to 1 but in-
stead are subject to the probability theory constraints that
PI(A ∧ B) is less than the minimum of PI(A) and PI(B) and
greater than both 0 and PI(A) + PI(B)  1. These restric-
tions mean that parameters PI(A ∧ B) can only vary within
a limited range: recovering values of PI(A) and PI(B) from
the Fisk and Pidgeon data, we find that the PI(A ∧ B) param-
eters can only vary within a range of approximately 0.15. To
acquire a measure of the degree of freedom this limited range
allows, we can consider Fisk and Pidgeon’s 29 data points as
corresponding to a single point in 29-dimensional cube of side
1 and volume 1, where each side of the cube represents the
value of one of our 29 parameters PI(A ∧ B). If the PI(A ∧ B)
parameters were fully free, their values could vary between
0 and 1 and some choice of parameters values could fit
any point in that cube, and so some choice of values would
necessarily fit Fisk and Pidgeon’s data. The restriction on
values of parameters PI(A ∧ B) that arise because of proba-
bility theory’s constraints, however, means that these param-
eters can only fit points that lie within a 29-dimensional
subcube with side approximately 0.15 (this is because these
parameters cannot vary between 0 and 1; instead, each pa-
rameter can only vary within a range of approximately
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0.15). The volume of this ‘fittable’ subcube is approximately
0.1529≈ 10 24, and so this subcube represents an absolutely
miniscule proportion of the overall space. Even with these
29 PI(A ∧ B) parameters, in other words, the set of
datapoints the model can fit is extremely restricted, and the
fact that the model fits the Fisk and Pidgeon data well pro-
vides strong support for the model.
A second concern is that these parameters PI(A ∧ B) may
have allowed the simulation to fit the Fisk and Pidgeon con-
junction fallacy data in a way that is not consistent with the
actual conjunctive probabilities in Fisk and Pidgeon’s exper-
iment. As we saw earlier, however, the conjunctive probabil-
ity estimates produced by the simulation were relatively
close to the conjunctive probability estimates produced by
participants in Fisk and Pidgeon’s experiment: the simulation
produced fallacy rates that were similar to those seen by Fisk
and Pidgeon while using conjunctive probability estimates
that were consistently close to those in Fisk and Pidgeon’s
study.
Overall, these results thus show that the noise model can
produce probability estimates and fallacy rates matching
those of Fisk and Pidgeon (1996) while retaining consistency
with probability theory in the underlying ‘true’ input proba-
bilities. These results do not demonstrate that the probability
theory plus noise model explicitly predicts the probability es-
timates and fallacy rates seen by Fisk and Pidgeon. Our aim
here is to show that the noise model can match those results,
not that it predicts those results in detail.
These simulation results demonstrate a number of impor-
tant aspects of our model. First, they show that the model can
produce a wide range of conjunction fallacy rates for differ-
ent conjunctions: conjunction fallacy rates in the simulation
ranged from as high as 68.8% to as low as 5.3%. Second,
they show that the model can produce probability estimates
with varying relationships between the conjunctive probabil-
ity and the constituent probabilities. In particular, while in
many cases, the average conjunctive probability produced
by the model was less than both constituent probabilities,
in some cases, the average conjunctive probability was
higher than one of the constituent probabilities.
To what extent is the observed fit between this simulation
and Fisk and Pidgeon’s results dependent on the specific
values of d and Δd? To examine this, we ran the simulation
again with a range of different values for these parameters
(d ranging from 0.01 to 0.20 in steps of 0.01 and Δd ranging
from 0.01 to 0.10 in steps of 0.01). Figure 1 illustrates the re-
lationship between one measure of goodness-of-fit (mean ab-
solute difference between simulated and observed fallacy
rates) and values of Δd between 0.01 and 0.1, for five differ-
ent values of d (d=0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2; the same rela-
tionship held for all other values of d). This figure shows
that the degree of fit did not depend greatly on the value of
d; it did, however, depend on the value of Δd. In particular,
the figure shows that the mean absolute difference in fallacy
rates was low (less than 10 on the 100-point percentage
scale) for all values of d when Δd = 0.01 but high (greater
than 30) for all values of d when Δd = 0.1. This graph sug-
gests that the simulation gives results that are fairly consis-
tent with Fisk and Pidgeon’s results for all values of
d < 0.1 and Δd < 0.05: they do not depend on the specific
values of d and Δd used in our initial simulation. The same
pattern held for our other measure of fit, the coefficient of
identity: with Δd = 0.01, the coefficient of identity was high
for all values of d (M = 0.97), but with Δd = 0.1, the coef-
ficient of identity was lower for all values of d (M = 0.78).
The fact that the degree of fit to conjunction fallacy data
depended primarily on the value of Δd is in line with our pro-
posal that the observed variation in fallacy rates can be ex-
plained as a consequence of increased noise in conjunctive
probability estimates (that is, in terms of Δd).
Fallacy rates for different conjunction types
Perhaps the main result from Fisk and Pidgeon’s experiment
was that conjunction fallacy rates were highest for conjunc-
tions where one constituent was likely and the other was un-
likely (LU, or likely-unlikely, type conjunctions), next
highest for LL conjunctions, and marginally lowest for UU
conjunctions (Table 2). Can our model account for this pat-
tern? Recall from our discussion of Equation (4) that con-
junction fallacy rates in our model depend on two things:
the difference between P(A ∧ B) and the probability of the
least likely constituent (the smaller that difference, the
greater the chance of a conjunction fallacy relative to that
constituent) and the extent to which P(A ∧ B) < 0.5: if
P(A ∧ B) is close to the probability of the least likely con-
stituent and P(A ∧ B) < 0.5, the model predicts fallacy
rates of over 50%, with rates rising with closer conjunctive
and constituent probabilities and with lower P(A ∧ B)
values. We can use these two factors to make predictions
about fallacy rates in LU, LL and UU conjunctions. We
consider each conjunction type separately here.
For LU conjunctions, we assume P(A) > 0.5 > P(B) (A
is likely and B is unlikely). In this case, the least likely con-
stituent is B, and fallacy rates are predicted to be high when
the difference between P(A ∧ B) and P(B) is small. For LU
conjunctions, however, the difference between P(A ∧ B)
and P(B) will always tend to be small and will decline as
Figure 1. This figure shows how one measure of goodness-of-fit
between our simulation and Fisk and Pidgeon’s conjunction fallacy
data depended on values of Δd between 0.01 and 0.1, for five differ-
ent values of d (d= 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2). Goodness-of-fit was
measured in terms of mean absolute difference between fallacy rates
for events in our simulation and fallacy rates for the same events in
Fisk and Pidgeon
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P(A) rises. Why is this? Probability theory requires that
P(A ∧ B) ≥ P(A) + P(B)  1 must hold for all events,
and so P(A ∧ B) must always be within 1P(A) of P(B).
For LU conjunctions, P(A) is high and so 1P(A) is small,
and P(A ∧ B) must always be relatively close to P(B), grow-
ing closer and closer as P(A) rises. For LU conjunctions, we
also have P(A ∧ B) < 0.5, because P(A ∧ B) < P(B)
necessarily holds and P(B) < 0.5. Because for LU conjunc-
tions, the difference between P(A∧B) and P(B) will tend to
be small and P(A ∧ B) < 0.5, the noise model predicts
high fallacy rates for LU conjunctions (fallacy rates tending
to be over 50%). Fisk and Pidgeon’s results support this pre-
diction: fallacy rates for LU conjunctions were greater than
50% for all but one LU conjunction in their data, with that
conjunction having a fallacy rate of 48.4% (Table 2) and with
the average fallacy rate for LU conjunctions being over
50% (Table 3).
For LL conjunctions, we assume P(A) > P(B) > 0.5
(both A and B are likely). Here again, the difference between
P(A ∧ B) and P(B) will tend to be small and will decline as
P(A) rises (for the same reason given earlier). In this
case, however, P(A ∧ B) < 0.5 does not hold, because if
P(A ∧ B) is close to P(B) and P(B) > 0.5, then P(A ∧ B)
0.5. In this case, the model predicts the conjunction fallacy
to be relatively frequent but always less than 50% (because
rates over 50% can only occur when P(A ∧ B) < 0.5,
which does not hold here). Fisk and Pidgeon’s results again
support this prediction: fallacy rates for LL conjunctions
were less than 50% for all but one LU conjunction in their
data, with that conjunction having a fallacy rate of 51.1%
(Table 2); the average fallacy rate for LU conjunctions was
less than 50% (Table 3).
Finally, for UU conjunctions, we assumeP(B) < P(A)< 0.5
(both A and B are unlikely). In this case, P(A ∧ B) may be
close to P(B) in some cases, but may be far from P(B) in
other cases. For UU conjunctions, P(A ∧ B) < 0.5 necessar-
ily holds, because P(A ∧ B) < P(B) < 0.5. Thus, the noise
model predicts that high fallacy rates (rates over 50%) may
occur for UU conjunctions, but only in those cases where
P(A ∧ B) happens to be close to P(B). For other UU conjunc-
tions, fallacy rates will be lower (less than 50%). Again, Fisk
and Pidgeon’s results support this prediction: fallacy rates
for UU conjunctions were less than 50% for all but one UU
conjunction: the UU conjunction with a fallacy rate over
50% (the UU conjunction in scenario 5 in Table 2) is also
the UU conjunction with the smallest difference between
conjunction and constituent probability estimates.
The probability theory plus noise model thus predicts that
fallacy rates will be highest for LU conjunctions and will be
lower for LL and UU conjunctions. The model does not
make a direct prediction about the relative fallacy rates for
LL and UU conjunctions: these fallacy rates will depend on
the actual conjunctive and constituent probabilities involved.
We therefore tested the model’s agreement with Fisk and
Pigeon’s results on fallacy rates for LU, LL and UU conjunc-
tions by considering the rate at which the simulation
produced conjunction fallacy responses for these different
types of conjunction. The original simulation did, indeed,
produce fallacy rates for these types of conjunction that
followed the pattern seen by Fisk and Pidgeon: fallacy rates
were highest for LU conjunctions, next highest for LL
conjunctions and marginally lowest for UU conjunctions
(Table 3). In our re-run of the simulation with a range of dif-
ferent values for d and Δd, we found that this pattern held in
all cases where d was between 0.01 and 0.1 and where Δd
was equal to 0.01 or 0.02 and held for no values of d or Δd
outside these ranges. This result demonstrates that the model
can produce results matching those of Fisk and Pidgeon for a
range of different parameter values. Again, the fact that the
match to Fisk and Pidgeon’s data depended primarily on
the value of Δd is in line with our proposal that the observed
variation in fallacy rates is a consequence of increased noise
in conjunctive probability estimates.
VARIATION AND VALUES OF THE ADDITION LAW
IDENTITY
Recall that our model predicts that values for the addition law
identity will be distributed around and close to zero in peo-
ple’s probability judgements and that our extended model
(with increased noise for conjunctions and disjunctions)
makes the further prediction that values for the addition
law identity will be distributed around zero in a way that
is directly proportional to both hPE(A)i + hPE(B)i  1 and
hPE (A ∧ B)i + hPE(A ∨ B)i  1.
We test these predictions using data from a previous ex-
periment examining the addition law (Experiment 1 in Cos-
tello and Watts (2014)). In this experiment, we asked 83
participants to estimate the likelihood of a range of weather
events A,B and conjunctions and disjunctions of those
events. Half of the participants were asked these questions
in a ‘probability format’ (asked ‘What is the probability that
the weather will be rainy on a randomly selected day in Ire-
land?’), and half were asked in a ‘frequency format’ (asked
to ‘Imagine a set of 100 different days, selected at random.
On how many of those 100 days do you think the weather
in Ireland would be rainy?’). We expect our model’s predic-
tions to hold for each question format; however, because the
‘frequency format’ questions are closer to the underlying
counting mechanisms that our model assumes, we expect
the match to predictions to be closer for this format. Simi-
larly, because we assume a lower rate of random noise for
single events than for conjunctions and disjunctions, we ex-
pect the single-event expression hPE(A)i + hPE(B)i  1
to be less subject to random variation and so a more accurate
predictor of variation in addition law values.




Single fallacy Double fallacy
(Observed) (Simulation) (Observed) (Simulation)
LL 36.5 32.3 19.3 3.1
LU 61.2 57.2 2.9 0.0
UU 29.7 30.5 4.9 1.7
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Addition law results
Table 4 shows the average values of hPE(A)i, hPE(B)i,
hPE(A∧B)i and hPE(A ∨ B)i for each pair of events in exper-
iment for both frequency format and probability format groups,
along with the average value for the addition law for each pair
and the value of the expressions hPE(A)i + hPE(B)i  1 and
hPE(A ∧ B)i + hPE(A ∨ B)i  1 for that pair. Values of
the addition law were distributed closely around 0 as pre-
dicted by the model in both groups, with overall means of
0.007 in both groups. We used one-sample t-tests across
all individual values for the addition law expression in the
frequency group (t(491) = 0.537) and in the probability
group (t(503) = 0.429) to calculate Bayes factors in favour
of or against the null hypothesis of a mean of 0 (Rouder,
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). Both analyses gave
strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis (JZS Bayes
factor =24.1 in the frequency group and JZS Bayes factor
=25.7 in the probability group), as predicted by the model.
While values of the addition law were distributed closely
around 0, these values did vary from one A,B pair to another.
In our model, this variation is expected to follow the terms
hPE(A)i + hPE(B)i  1 and hPE(A ∧ B)i + hPE(A ∨ B)i 1.
There were reliable overall correlations between addi-
tion law values and the hPE(A)i + hPE(B)i 1 and
hPE(A ∧ B)i + hPE(A ∨ B)i  1 expressions (r = 0.58,
p < 0.01 and r = 0.43,p < 0.05, respectively). As ex-
pected, correlations were higher in the frequency
format group than in the probability format group and higher
for the single-event expression hPE(A)i + hPE(B)i  1 than
for the hPE(A ∧ B)i + hPE(A ∨ B)i  1 expression.
Our model predicts that the sign of the addition law value
should follow the sign of PE(A) + PE(B)  1 (the addition
law being positive when this expression is positive and negative
when it is negative). The results supported this prediction. Of
the 24 pairs of values for these expressions in Table 4, there
were 10 cases where both were positive, 9 cases where both
were negative and 5 where they differed in sign (p < 0.05 in
Fisher’s exact test). Our model makes the same prediction for
hPE(A ∧ B)i + hPE(A ∨ B)i  1 and the addition law. This
prediction was also supported: of the 24 pairs of values for these
expressions, eight were both positive, nine were both negative
and seven differed in sign (p < 0.05 in Fisher’s exact test).
Table 4. Average probability estimates for pairs of weather events from participants in the ‘frequency format’ and ‘probability format’ groups
in Experiment 1, Costello and Watts (2014) and average values of the addition law identity for each pair of events





PE(A ∧ B) +
PE(A ∨ B)  1
Frequency format group (n= 41)
Cloudy Cold 0.77 0.76 0.68 0.08 0.05 0.53 0.48
Cold Windy 0.76 0.72 0.63 0.76 0.09 0.48 0.39
Sunny Cold 0.39 0.76 0.42 0.82 0.09 0.15 0.24
Cold Thundery 0.76 0.13 0.22 0.67 0.00 0.11 0.11
Cloudy Frosty 0.77 0.31 0.33 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04
Frosty Windy 0.31 0.72 0.33 0.59 0.01 0.02 0.08
Sunny Frosty 0.39 0.31 0.25 0.55 0.01 0.31 0.21
Frosty Thundery 0.31 0.13 0.15 0.35 0.07 0.57 0.05
Cloudy Sleety 0.77 0.02 0.33 0.66 0.03 0.04 0.01
Sleety Windy 0.02 0.72 0.27 0.59 0.05 0.09 0.14
Sunny Sleety 0.39 0.02 0.16 0.45 0.02 0.42 0.39
Sleety Thundery 0.02 0.13 0.16 0.26 0.01 0.68 0.58
Mean of addition law values 0.007
Correlation with addition law values 0.65* 0.52
Probability format group (n= 42)
Cloudy Cold 0.74 0.73 0.67 0.77 0.02 0.46 0.44
Cold Windy 0.73 0.71 0.66 0.73 0.05 0.44 0.39
Sunny Cold 0.39 0.73 0.47 0.75 0.01 0.12 0.22
Cold Thundery 0.73 0.02 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.07
Cloudy Frosty 0.74 0.32 0.37 0.64 0.05 0.06 0.01
Frosty Windy 0.32 0.71 0.41 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.00
Sunny Frosty 0.39 0.32 0.31 0.51 0.01 0.29 0.18
Frosty Thundery 0.32 0.02 0.22 0.35 0.05 0.48 0.43
Cloudy Sleety 0.74 0.28 0.04 0.62 0.00 0.02 0.02
Sleety Windy 0.28 0.71 0.35 0.59 0.05 0.00 0.06
Sunny Sleety 0.39 0.28 0.02 0.49 0.01 0.32 0.31
Sleety Thundery 0.28 0.02 0.21 0.29 0.01 0.51 0.05
Mean of addition law values 0.007
Correlation with addition law values 0.46 0.31
Overall correlation with addition law values 0.58** 0.43*
Average values for the expressions hPE(A)i + hPE(B)i  1 and hPE(A ∧ B)i + hPE(A ∨ B)i  1 are also shown. Overall, both expressions had a signifi-
cant positive correlation with addition law values, as predicted.
*p< 0.05.
**p< 0.01.
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These results support our model’s predictions about the addi-
tion law: values for that identity were close to zero for all individ-
ual conjunctions, and values varied around zero in a way that
matches the predictions of the extended d+Δdmodel. These re-
sults distinguish our model’s account for the addition law iden-
tity from the weighted averaging account (Nilsson et al., 2009;
Nilsson et al., 2016), which does not make these predictions.
Comparing variance of single and conjunctive events
We also use the data from this experiment to compare the de-
gree of variability in people’s probability estimates for single
and conjunctive events. Table 5 shows the SDs in people’s
estimates PE(A), PE(B) and PE(A ∧ B) for the 12 pairs of
events in the experiment for both the frequency format and
the probability format groups. There are two points to note
about the data in this table. First, the degree of variability
(SD) in people’s estimates for events A, B and A∧B was re-
liably lower for estimates in the frequency format group than
for estimates in the probability format group. Of the 36 pos-
sible comparisons (12 event pairs by three estimates: PE(A),
PE(B) and PE(A∧B)), 34 comparisons (95%) showed lower
variability (lower SD) in the frequency format group. This
is broadly consistent with the approach taken in our model:
because our model assumes that probability estimates are
fundamentally frequentist (based on counting event occur-
rence), we would expect there to be less noise in frequency
estimates, and so less variability in those estimates.
The second point to note is that the degree of variability
(SD) in people’s estimates for single events A and B tended
to be lower than the degree of variability in estimates for con-
junctions A ∧ B. This pattern was particularly evident in the
frequency format group, where the SDs of both constituents
A and B were less than the SD of the conjunction A ∧ B in
10 out of 12 event pairs (the average SD value for single
events in this group was 0.16 against an average SD value
for conjunctions of 0.22). This pattern was less evident in
the probability format group, where it only held for six out
of 12 pairs (and where there was little difference in the aver-
ages). Because an initial assessment showed that probability
estimates for events in this experiment were approximately
normally distributed, we carried out an indicative statistical
test to compare conjunctive and constituent variability using
the F-test for equality of variance. In the frequency format
group, the F-test for equality of variance (df1 = df2 = 40)
showed a significant difference in variance in the pre-
dicted direction in 58% of comparisons (p < 0.05), with
the difference being somewhat close to significant (around
p = 0.10) in another 17% of comparisons. A similar com-
parison for the probability format group (df1 =df2 = 41),
however, showed almost no significant differences (p < 0.05
in only 12.5% of comparisons). This smaller difference in var-
iability between single and conjunctive events in the probabil-
ity format group may simply be a consequence of the higher
overall degree of variability in that group. In general, these
results are consistent with the idea that random variation is
higher in probability estimates for conjunctions than those for
single events (with this difference becoming more visible in
cases were the overall level of variability is lower).
DISCUSSION
Our aim in this paper has been to show that a detailed version
of our probability theory plus noise model can explain the
high rates of conjunction fallacy occurrence seen for some
materials such as Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda. This de-
tailed version is, we think, both natural and reasonable: it re-
flects the fact that complex expressions like conjunctions and
disjunctions may be more subject to random error, simply be-
cause they are more complex (and so provide more opportu-
nity for such random error to occur). Our results show that
high rates of occurrence of the conjunction fallacy cannot
be taken as evidence that people’s mechanisms for estimating
probabilities do not follow probability theory: these high
rates can arise purely because of random noise in such a
Table 5. Standard deviation in estimates for single and conjunctive weather events from participants in the ‘frequency format’ and ‘probability
format’ groups in Experiment 1, Costello and Watts (2014) (mean values for these estimates are show in Table 4). SDs for single events were
reliably lower than SDs for conjunctions, especially in the Frequency format group (where the SDs for PE(A) and for PE(B) were lower than
the SD for PE(A ∧B) in but 2 cases)
A B
Frequency format group (n= 41) Probability format group (n= 42)
SD of PE(A) SD of PE(B) SD of PE(A ∧B) SD of PE(A) SD of PE(B) SD of PE(A ∧B)
Cloudy Cold 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.23
Cold Windy 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.24
Sunny Cold 0.17 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.20
Cold Thundery 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.25
Cloudy Frosty 0.12 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.27
Frosty Windy 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.17 0.26
Sunny Frosty 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.24
Frosty Thundery 0.19 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.21
Cloudy Sleety 0.12 0.18 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.27
Sleety Windy 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.25
Sunny Sleety 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.19
Sleety Thundery 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.16
Average 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.23
SD, standard deviation.
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rational reasoning process. Our results support this model in
other ways by showing that this extended model can account
for the relatively minor variation in values of the addition law
around probability theory’s required value of 0 and that var-
iability in estimates for conjunctions tends to be higher than
variability in estimates for single events.
Scope of the model
What is the scope of our model? Because the model assumes
that the probability P(A) is estimated by retrieving a random
sample of episodes from memory and counting the number
of A’s, it may seem that the model is only able to give prob-
ability estimates for events that have already been seen. This
view depends on a conception of memory as being nothing
but a store of recorded events. We can, however, take an al-
ternative conception of memory as a constructive process
that can generate representations of events, even if those spe-
cific events have not previously been seen. Support for this
view comes from evidence that remembering past events
and imagining future events are very similar cognitive pro-
cesses (e.g. Schacter, 2012).
If we take this ‘constructive’ or ‘simulation’ view of
memory, then our model can apply to probability estimates
for all forms of event, whether previously seen or completely
novel. In this view, an estimate of P(A) is produced by taking
a random sample of episodes generated by constructive
memory and counting the number that are A’s. Random noise
in the counting process causes the observed patterns of bias
and agreement with probability theory in these estimates, as
described by the model.
Under this view, we would expect to see the similar agree-
ment with probability theory for cancelling expressions such
as the addition law in situations where we ask people to esti-
mate probabilities for events that they have repeatedly expe-
rienced in the past (such as the weather events in our
experiment), for past events that they have not directly expe-
rienced, for future events and for events that are to some de-
gree imaginary. Experimental results support these
predictions. For example, in an experiment asking partici-
pants to estimate the probability of people over the age of
60 years having certain diseases (such as Alzheimer’s and di-
abetes), having conjunctions of those diseases (Alzheimer’s
and diabetes) and having disjunctions of those diseases
(Alzheimer’s or diabetes), Costello and Mathison (2014)
found that people’s probability estimates gave a value for
the addition law that was, on average, very close to 0 as
required by probability theory. In an experiment asking
participants to estimate the probability of a range of future
events (such as a future increase in cigarette taxes and a
future decline in smoking rates) and of various conjunctions
and disjunctions of those events, we found that people’s
probability estimates gave values for the addition law that
were, on average, very close to 0 as required by probability
theory; similar results held for a number of other such
‘cancelling’ expressions (Costello & Watts, 2015b). Finally,
in an experiment where participants were given personality
descriptions for a range of imaginary people and then asked
to assess the probability of various direct, conjunctive,
disjunctive and conditional statements being true for those
people, Fisher and Wolfe (2014) found that people’s proba-
bility estimates gave a value for the addition law that was,
again, very close to 0 as required by probability theory.
Together, these results suggest that our model applies to
probability estimation for events in general and is not limited
solely to events that have previously been seen.
Factors influencing random error
The model we describe here makes three assumptions about
random error in the proposed counting process behind prob-
ability estimation: that it is random, that it is symmetric and
that it can be higher for complex expressions (such as con-
junctions or disjunctions) than for the constituents of those
expressions. We expect, however, that various general fac-
tors can influence this rate of random error in an experimen-
tal setting.
One such factor is simply individual differences between
participants. We would expect that, when asking a group of
participants to estimate the probability of some event A,
some participants would have a higher rate of random noise
(a higher value of d), while others would have a lower rate.
Because in our model, the conjunction fallacy is a conse-
quence of this random noise, we would expect higher con-
junction fallacy rates for participants with higher values of
d than for participants with lower values of d, all else being
equal. Experimental results support this prediction. For
example, Costello and Watts (2014) used various probabilis-
tic expressions to estimate the value of d for individual par-
ticipants in their experiments and found that this value was
significantly correlated with the rate at which those partici-
pants committed the conjunction fallacy.
Another such factor is task demands. We would expect
that more complex probability assessment tasks would
involve higher rates of random error in probability assess-
ment, while simpler tasks would have lower rates. Examples
of more complex probability assessment tasks might involve
those where stories or descriptions are provided to frame the
required probability assessment and where participants must
assess probabilities relative to those descriptions (as in
Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda example). Examples of less
complex assessment tasks would be those that simply ask
participants to assess probabilities directly, with no framing
description, as our previous studies, which simply asked par-
ticipants to estimate the probability of different types of
weather such as ‘rain’, ‘wind’ and ‘rain and wind’ (Costello,
2009a; Costello & Watts, 2014). Because the rate of occur-
rence of the conjunction fallacy depends on the value of d
in our model, we would expect higher fallacy rates for more
complex tasks and lower rates for less complex tasks, all else
being equal. We would also expect probability ranking tasks
(where people are given a set of events and asked to simply
choose the most probable) to be associated with higher rates
of d than probability estimation tasks (where people are ex-
plicitly asked to estimate the probability of each event). This
is because the requirement to produce an explicit probability
estimate would, we think, cause people to focus more atten-
tion on the value of that estimate, so reducing the rate of
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random error. Experimental results are approximately consis-
tent with these expectations: for example, conjunction fallacy
rates were lower in our weather tasks (which asked people to
assess probabilities directly, with no framing description)
than in Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda task (which asked
people to assess probabilities relative to a framing descrip-
tion about Linda’s background and education). Fallacy rates
are also typically lower in probability estimation tasks than in
probability ranking tasks (Wedell & Moro, 2008).
Finally, a third possible factor affecting the rate of random
noise is overall event complexity. Some probability assess-
ment studies involve relatively simple events such as ‘rain’
or ‘wind’ (Costello, 2009a; Costello & Watts, 2014). Other
studies, however, involve quite complex events; for example,
Costello and Watts (2015b) asked people to assess the prob-
ability of events such as ‘The Irish Government increases
taxes on cigarettes in the next budget’ and ‘Smoking rates
in Ireland decrease significantly in 2015’. We would expect
such complex events to be associated with higher rates of
random error d, simply because they are more complex and
so have more ‘points of failure’: more points at which ran-
dom error can have an impact. Again, experimental results
are roughly consistent with this expectation: estimates for d
were noticeably higher for the complex events used in Cos-
tello & Watts, (2015a,c) than for the simpler events used in
Costello (2009a) and Costello and Watts (2014).
Given this point about the relationship between overall
event complexity and the degree of associated random noise,
it is obvious that our model’s assumption of one rate of error
for single events and a higher rate for conjunctive events rep-
resents a fairly large simplification. In particular, some con-
junctions involve two almost atomic constituents of
relatively low complexity: for example the ‘red triangle’ and
‘green square’ conjunctions used by Zhao et al. (2009). Other
conjunctions, such as ‘The Irish Government increases taxes
on cigarettes in the next budget and Smoking rates in Ireland
decrease significantly in 2015’, involve constituents that are
themselves conjunctions of various other, simpler compo-
nents. Examples such as these suggest that a sharp delineation
between single events and conjunctions is not as straightfor-
ward as it initially appears and is assumed to be in our model.
It is clear from these suggestions about memory as simula-
tion, about factors influencing noise and about the distinction
between single events and conjunctions that our model is
underspecified. Why do we not describe, in our model, exactly
how memory works and precisely how these different levels of
complexity and degrees of noise operate and interact? We
could, for example, follow the approach taken in the
Minerva-DM memory retrieval model of decision making
(Dougherty et al., 1999) or in Hilbert’s ‘noisy channel’ account
of biases in probability estimation (Hilbert, 2012). This
underspecification in our model is intentional. Our aim in de-
veloping the probability theory plus noise account is to pro-
duce a model of probabilistic reasoning that is simple enough
to produce clear and testable predictions about people’s proba-
bility estimates. By deliberately describing the role of noise in
an abstract, mathematical way, we are able to make such pre-
dictions. Both the Minerva-DM model and Hilbert’s model
are quite complex: each contains a range of different
components, interacting in various different ways and con-
trolled by various different parameters (see Costello & Watts,
2014, for comparisons between our model and these more
complex alternatives). Such complex models are less amenable
to the type of analysis needed to derive clear and testable
predictions.
We see the development of the probability theory plus
noise model as involving a series of increasing levels of ap-
proximation to the processes of human probability estima-
tion, with each level of approximation introducing some
important factor that was not included in previous levels. In
this view, standard probability theory itself represents a
zeroth-order approximation of human probabilistic reason-
ing: it includes (what we see as) the dominant factor in
people’s probability estimation (that is, the observed fre-
quency of events) but does not include another important
factor, which is noise in reasoning. The probability theory
plus noise model represents a first-order approximation
(it includes both the observed frequency of events and a ba-
sic approximation of noise in reasoning). The current model,
then, represents a second-order approximation (it includes
the observed frequency of events and a two-part approxima-
tion of noise in reasoning). Higher-order approximations
would involve more detailed representations of noise includ-
ing an account of the structure and complexity of the constit-
uents involved in conjunctions. Our future work will involve
further, incremental development within this framework.
Theoretical position
Our theoretical proposal here is that human probabilistic rea-
soning is based on a fundamentally rational process (one that
follows frequentist probability theory) that is subject to ran-
dom noise. It is important to stress that we not suggesting
that people are consciously aware of the equations of proba-
bility theory when estimating probabilities. That is clearly
not the case, given the high rates of conjunction fallacy oc-
currence in people’s judgements for some events. Instead,
we propose that people’s probability judgements are derived
from a ‘black box’ that estimates the probability of an event
by retrieving (some analogue of) a count of instances of that
event from memory. Such a mechanism is necessarily subject
to the requirements of set theory and therefore embodies the
rules of probability theory.
It is equally important to stress that we are not suggesting
that people’s probability estimates are themselves rational.
Again, this is clearly not the case: there is very extensive ev-
idence demonstrating that people’s probability estimates are
systematically biased away from the requirements of proba-
bility theory. We argue that these biases are a consequence
of the influence of random noise on the probability estimates
generated by an underlying rational process. While this noise
is random, it has systematic, directional effects: for example,
our noisy model’s expected averages for probability esti-
mates are systematically biased away from the ‘true’ proba-
bility values in a way that seems to match the biases seen
in people’s estimates.
It is useful to expand on our distinction between the ratio-
nality of a process (for probability estimation) and the
318 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Behav. Dec. Making, 30, 304–321 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/bdm
rationality of the outputs (the probability estimates) produced
by that process. Some might argue that is wrong to classify a
reasoning process as ‘rational’ when the outputs it produces
are systematically biased away from the objectively correct, ra-
tional requirements. We feel that this argument holds only in a
perfectly noise-free situation: if there were no noise in reason-
ing, then we would indeed expect a rational process to produce
outputs that exactly match the objectively correct rational re-
quirements in all cases, and we would classify a process as ir-
rational if its outputs deviated from those rational requirements
in any way. When we consider the problem of reasoning in a
noisy environment, however, the position is different. Here,
no reasoning process can meet the strict criteria for rationality:
no process can produce outputs that match objectively correct
rational requirements in all cases (because every process is
subject to random error due to noise). Given that the presence
of noise puts limits on the extent to which any process can ap-
proach ‘perfect’ rationality (the more noise is present, the more
every process will be subject to error), we need a more subtle
criterion for the rationality of a reasoning process. A natural
criterion is one that classifies a process as rational if the outputs
from that process come to match the objectively correct ratio-
nal requirements more and more closely as the degree of noise
in the reasoning environment falls, with a perfect match when
noise falls to zero. Our model exactly satisfies this requirement,
because it reduces to standard probability theory when the
noise terms d and Δd are both zero.
Our argument has broader implications for research on
patterns of bias in aspects of people’s probabilistic
decision-making. A common pattern in such research is to
identify a systematic bias in people’s probability estimates
and to then take that bias as evidence that people do not rea-
son via the rules of probability theory but instead use some
alternative, normatively incorrect, heuristic process. The con-
junction fallacy is a major locus of this pattern: faced with
the reliable occurrence of the conjunction fallacy in people’s
probability judgements, researchers have suggested that peo-
ple estimate conjunctive probabilities using heuristics such as
representativeness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), signed
summation (Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996), configural weighted av-
eraging (Nilsson et al., 2009), pragmatic inference (Hertwig
& Gigerenzer, 1999) and inductive confirmation (Crupi,
Fitelson, & Tentori, 2008; Tentori et al., 2013). Our results,
however, suggest that this leap from an observed bias to an
inferred heuristic (motivated by, and intended to explain, that
bias) is premature. This is because random noise in reasoning
can cause systematic biases in people’s responses even when
people are using normatively correct reasoning processes,
and so there is little need to propose an alternative heuristic
to explain those biases (see Budescu, Erev, & Wallsten,
1997; Erev et al., 1994, for similar arguments). To demon-
strate conclusively that people are using heuristics, re-
searchers must show that observed biases cannot be
explained as the result of systematic effects caused by ran-
dom noise.
This position leads to a particular view on the motivation
for alternative theories of probability estimation. It seems
clear to us that the various alternative accounts (representa-
tiveness, or denominator neglect or other heuristic
approaches) are motivated by the assumption that the ob-
served biases and errors seen in people’s probability judge-
ments cannot be explained by probability theory. This
motivation arises because probability theory is the normative
model against which these biases and errors are assessed. If
researchers had not taken those biases and errors as evidence
that people do not reason using probability theory, they would
have had no reason to propose those alternative accounts.
However, our model suggests that these biases do not, in fact,
count as evidence that people do not reason using probability
theory. Those alternative models thus lose their fundamental
motivation: there is no reason for moving from probability
theory to those alternative accounts in an attempt to explain
human probabilistic reasoning. There is, in contrast, an under-
lying motivation for the probability theory plus noise model:
the probability of events in the world necessarily follows the
rules of probability theory, and our reasoning processes are
necessarily subject to noise.
Our model is not the only way of accounting for biases in
probability judgements while maintaining consistency with
probability theory in the mechanism behind those judgements.
The quantum probability model (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012;
Busemeyer, Pothos, Franco, & Trueblood, 2011) takes a
somewhat similar approach. It describes a mechanism that
starts with classical probability theory as its base but uses
quantum mechanical ideas to add corrections that account
for various observed biases (e.g. the conjunction fallacy) in
certain situations. More precisely, the quantum probability
expressions for P(A) and P(B) reduce exactly to standard
probability theory when the events A and B are ‘compatible’,
that is, when both probabilities can be estimated simulta-
neously using the same set of features. It is only when the
events being estimated are ‘incompatible’ (that is, when they
cannot both be estimated simultaneously using the same set
of features) that this model deviates from standard probability
theory by introducing quantum theoretic interference terms
that, according to the model, produce the observed biases.
While this model is in some ways quite close to our own
(being based on standard probability theory, and reducing
exactly to that theory in certain situations), it still suffers from
the problem of motivation seen for heuristic accounts: as far as
we can see, there is no a priori motivation for such quantum
interference effects (beyond simply fitting the data on ob-
served biases). This, again, is in contrast with our model,
where the presence of noise in the model is motivated by the
unavoidable fact of noise in both the world and the brain. To
make a clear distinction between the quantum probability
model and the noise model, we need to carry out empirical
tests to assess the competing predictions of these accounts.
We aim to do this in future work.
CONCLUSIONS
The fundamental idea in our model is that people’s process
for estimating probabilities follows the requirements of
probability theory and that the systematic biases away from
probability theory seen in people’s judgements are simply
the consequence of random error in that process. In other
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work we have shown that this model can explain biases such
as conservatism, subadditivity and binary complementarity.
We have also shown that for expressions in which this
model predicts bias should be cancelled, people’s probabi-
lity estimates agree closely with the requirements of the
probability theory just as predicted by the model (Costello
& Watts, 2014). Here we have shown that this model can
explain biases such as the conjunction fallacy and, in par-
ticular, can explain the high rates of conjunction fallacy
occurrence for some conjunctions. Taken together, our re-
sults give evidence against the popular idea that people
estimate probabilities using heuristics that do not follow
the normative requirements of probability theory (Ariely,
2009; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Kahneman, 2011;
Shafir & Leboeuf, 2002).
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